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How TO REALLY CURB THE PILLAGING OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Michael A. McGregor*
When delegates were negotiating the creation of the International Criminal
Court, there was debate, among other things, as to who would fall under the
jurisdiction of the court. Due to time constraints, negotiators settled on a
narrow extension of customary international law and limited the court's
jurisdiction to "natural persons" only. This settlement has had an unset-
tling effect when it comes to "resource conflicts. " Some corporations, as
legal persons, and their officers have been able to pillage the natural re-
sources from war-torn countries with little to no liability under internation-
al criminal law. This Note considers one example ofpillaging by both offic-
ers and corporations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. After ana-
lyzing this example, this Note proposes amending the International Crimi-
nal Court'sjurisdiction statute to include corporations. Such an amendment
will ensure that both officers and corporations are held liable for violations
of international criminal law.
1. INTRODUCTION
The illicit and illegal exploitation of natural resources is a growing prob-
lem that serves to fuel conflict and increasingly involves and harms the se-
curity of the civilian population. This has been a hallmark of the conflict in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but is common to many conflict
situations. Individuals and companies take advantage of, maintain and
have even initiated armed conflicts in order to plunder destabilized coun-
tries to enrich themselves, with devastating consequences for civilian
populations.
- Former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Anan'
* Executive Notes Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. B.A.,
University of Texas at Tyler (2006); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law
(2010). To my parents David and Mary McGregor and Debbie and Mark Wallis, without
your continued guidance and patience, I would certainly not be the man that I have grown to
be, thank you. To my brothers, sisters, and the rest of my extended family, thank you for the
unconditional support throughout the years. Finally, to Tim and Jennifer Underhill, and Joey
and Vecky Elliott, you helped push me to reach for new heights and to achieve new dreams
during the most trying of times, for that I am eternally grateful. Thank you.
I The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict, 58, U.N. Doc S/2002/1300 (Nov. 26, 2008).
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The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is cursed with some
of the richest natural resource concessions in the world.2 "[It] is awash with
gold, diamonds, and metals such as cassiterite and coltan used to weld small
pieces together in electronics." 3 These resources have fueled one of the
bloodiest and deadliest conflicts in the last sixty years.4 Foreign armies,
rebel forces, and the DRC government have all plundered the DRC's natural
resources to further their control over the country's wealth and people. 5 The
conflict is responsible for the loss of more than four million lives and the
displacement of even more refugees.6
Scholars have detailed the link between natural resources and the
exploitation of mineral concessions by soldiers and governments to finance
aggressive campaigns against their opponents.7 Recent literature in this field
calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to punish the perpetrators of
these mass atrocities by charging them with the war crime of pillage under
Articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v) of the Rome Statute.8 The perpetrators
being targeted include soldiers and political leaders that contribute to the
conflicts. However, these calls ignore an important perpetrator of resource-
fueled wars. That overlooked group consists of corporations, businesses,
and industries that extract, export, and sell the pillaged resources. These
2 GLOBAL WITNESS, DIGGING IN CORRUPTION: FRAUD, ABUSE, AND EXPLOITATION IN
KATANGA'S COPPER AND COBALT MINES 4 (2006). See also Louise Watt, Mining For Miner-
als Fuels Congo Conflict, S.F. GATE, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http//www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/arficle.cgi?f=-/n/a2008/1 1/01/international/i002928D84.DTL ("The international value of
Congo's raw materials is demonstrated by a $9 billion deal between Congo's state-owned
mining company, G6camines, and a consortium of Chinese companies to extract 10.6 million
tons of copper and 626,000 tons of cobalt in return for improving infrastructure.").
3 Watt, supra note 2.
4 See The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploita-
tion of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, U.N. Doc. S/2002/1146 (Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Final Report]. See also
CHRISTOPHER W. MULLINS AND DAWN L. ROTHE, BLOOD, POWER, AND BEDLAM: VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA 158-64 (2008).
5 See Watt, supra note 2.
6 GLOBAL WITNESS, supra note 2, at 9.
7 See generally INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARMED
CONFLICT: BEYOND GREED AND GRIEVANCE (Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman eds., 2003)
(linking the globalization of the natural resource markets to creation of opportunities for
armed factions to pursue their agendas in civil wars); THE WORLD BANK, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND ACTIONS (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds.
2003) (examining the links between resource conflicts and rebel financing); PHILIPPE LE
BILLON, FUELLING WAR (2005) (analyzing how money from resource exploitation more often
benefits repressive regimes and rebel groups).
8 See, e.g., Michael A. Lundberg, Note, The Plunder of Natural Resources During War: A
War Crime (?), 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 495 (2008).
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actors help create the market for states and armies to move pillaged re-
sources out of the conflict areas. Additionally, they provide billions of dol-
lars to government and rebel groups who use such funding to conduct their
crimes. 9
While acknowledging that the ICC should pursue resource pillaging
as a war crime, this Note argues that prosecuting soldiers and political lead-
ers alone will not eliminate the pillaging of natural resources, as the demand
for the minerals and resources will remain. In order to deter resource con-
flicts, the international community must hold the corporations, businesses,
and industries that fund resource conflicts accountable under international
criminal law. 10 To facilitate this effort, this Note examines the applicability
of the ICC's pillaging statutes to the corporate world."
Part I of this Note explores the history of the Tenke-Fungurume
concessions in the DRC. It shines light on actions of corporations that have
pillaged valuable resources from the Congolese people. 12 This pillaging has
supplied warring factions with the financial means to carry out war crimes
and crimes against humanity. Part II provides a synopsis of the ICC's pillag-
ing statute and the elements of pillage. Part III discusses the current criminal
liability under the ICC's statute by examining the statute's principal and
aider and abettor provisions and applying the provisions to individuals and
corporations accused of pillaging natural resources in the DRC. Part III also
demonstrates how the ICC could find individual directors and officers liable
for their actions while corporations-as legal persons-enjoy an implicit
immunity from prosecution. Finally, Part IV recommends that the interna-
tional community must change the current shortcomings of the ICC's crimi-
nal liability statute to refocus on what actions are punishable instead of who
is punishable. This paradigm shift needs to be codified in the ICC's statute
by giving the ICC jurisdiction over legal persons as well as natural persons.
9 See Watt, supra note 2.
10 This is an age old argument about supply and demand. So long as there is a demand for
the precious metals that are only found in small regions of the world, businesses will attempt
to sell such materials. While most businesses will take into account the situation on the
ground there will always be one or two companies that are willing to turn their eyes away
from the conflict so long as they make a profit.
11 When it comes to elements of the crime, the two subsections dealing with pillage are
virtually the same. The only difference is that Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) applies to international
conflicts and Article (8)(2)(e)(v) applies to internal conflicts.
12 The example provided in Part I deals with action in respect to the Tenke-Fungurume
concessions. Many of the actions that occurred, including the initial misappropriation by
rebel and government forces, occurred in the 1990's and early 2000's and would fall outside
of the jurisdiction of the ICC. However, the example provides a useful illustration of the
influence of corporations in resource conflicts and can provide helpful insight on how to cure
the problem. Furthermore, the focus of this Note is on liability of the corporations and their
officers involved in the pillaging of resources. Therefore, this Note will only discuss the
initial pillaging by rebel and government forces when necessary to prove accessory liability.
2009]
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II. CORPORATE PILLAGING AT THE TENKE-FUNGURUME CONCESSIONS
The Tenke-Fungurume concessions, situated in the Katanga Prov-
ince of southern DRC, is home to "one of the largest, highest-grade, unde-
veloped copper/cobalt concessions in the world today."' 13 Once production
begins, the annual yield of the mine is estimated to be two-hundred and fifty
million pounds of London Grade A copper and eighteen million pounds of
cobalt, with the initial project continuing for forty years. 14 Production is
slated to begin in 2009. '
The history of the Tenke-Fungurume concessions, once operated by
the state-owned mining company La Gdndrale des Carri&res et des Mines
(G6camines), reveals corporate participation in the pillaging of the DRC's
natural resources. In the early 1990s, under President Mobutu Sese Seko,
the Congolese government began privatizing the DRC's mining industry.' 6
In 1994, then Prime Minister Kengo Wa Dondo, a strong ally to President
Seko, forced privatizations of the DRC's mining industry, and compelled
Gdcamines to release management and mining rights to joint ventures and
private companies. ' 7 In November 1996, G~camines entered into an agree-
ment with Lundin Holdings S.A. (Lundin Holdings) and obtained a forty-
five percent stake in the new Tenke Fungurume Mining Company (TFM),
the other fifty-five percent belonging to Lundin Holdings. 18
At the time of the 1996 contract, total revenue produced by the two
concessions after twenty-seven years of operation was estimated at twenty-
six billion dollars. 19 Lundin Group, the parent company of Lundin Hold-
ings, negotiated the 1996 contract knowing that negotiators for G&camines
had little to no experience with similar joint ventures and capitalized on that
inexperience. a Specifically, in his book No Guts, No Glory, Lundin Group
13 Dorothy Kosich, Freeport-McMoRan Tenke Fungurume Hiring Protest Turns Violent,
MINEWEB, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.mineweb.co.za/mineweb/view/mineweb/enI/
page43?oid=44495&sn=Detail (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
14 Lundin Mining, Tenke Fungurume Copper/Cobalt Deposit: DRC, http://www.
lundinmining.com/s/TenkeFungurume.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2009); Freeport-McMoran
Copper & Gold: Tenke Fungurume, http://www.fcx.com/operations/AfricaTenke.htm (last
visited Sept. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Freeport-McMoran].
15 Freeport-McMoran, supra note 14.
16 RAF CUSTERS & SARA NORDBRAND, IPIS, RISKY BusINESS: THE LUNDIN GROUP'S
INVOLVEMENT IN THE TENKE FUNGURUME MINING PROJECT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO 12 (2008), available at httpJ/www.ipisresearch.be/natural-resources.php (last visited
Sept. 11, 2009) (report compiled by Swedish and Dutch non-governmental organizations
investigating Swedish business connections with the Tenke-Fungurume concession).
" Id. at 14.
18 id.
'9 Id. atl7.
20 Id. at 16.
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founder Adolf Lundin confessed that in order to get the deal, he offered
President Seko a future campaign contribution and paid fifteen DRC nego-
tiators one-thousand dollars each to show up and vote for the contract.2'
In 1997, an uprising forced President Seko from power.22 The lead-
er of the rebel movement, Laurent-Ddsird Kabila, became President. 23 Lun-
din Holdings quickly confirmed the Gdcamines contract with Kabila's gov-
ernment and paid an initial fee. 24 However, the confirmation of the Gdca-
mines contract with Kabila's government was not Lundin Holding's first
encounter with Kabila. Evidence demonstrates that Lundin Holdings estab-
lished a relationship with the Alliance des Forces Dgmocratiques de Libgra-
tion (AFDL), Kabila's rebel army, prior to the AFDL's ascension to pow-
er. 25 These contacts were made despite international condemnation of the
slaughtering of civilians and other crimes against humanity and war crimes
by members of the AFDL, members of the Forces Armies Zarroises (FAZ)
that supported President Seko, and members of the Forces Arm&s Rwan-
daises (ex-FAR).26
Corruption also characterized the Gdcamines contract's confirma-
tion. Later reports established that up to half of the initial fifty million dollar
payment Lundin Holdings made to Kabila's government funneled into a
private company, Comiex, Inc., which was partially owned by President
Kabila.27
Operations at the mines never commenced and in 1999 Lundin
Holdings declared a force majeure under the contract provisions.28 That
21 Id. at 17 (citing ROBERT ERIKSsON, ADOLF H LuNmoN: MED OLA I ADRORNA OCH GULD
I BLICK (2003)).
22 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK 2008, at 138 (2008).
23 Id.
24 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 19.
25 Id. at 20. This relationship started before the rebel army had taken over the Katanga
province.
26 See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: DEADLY
ALLIANCES IN CONGOLESE FORESTS (Dec. 3, 1997), available at http://repository.
forcedmigration.org/show-metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:3975.
27 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 4.
28 Id. at 22. The report found that:
The actual war was not a reason to declare Force Majeure, as that part of Katanga
did not directly suffer from war operations. TFM and Tenke Mining Corp. based
its declaration of Force Majeure on two presidential decrees, issued a month earli-
er, which contained security measures for the whole of the territory. There were,
however, troops at TFM's concession during the war. They were part of the larger
army contingents that the DR Congo's President Laurent-Ddsird Kabila held in re-
serve behind the front line in the Katanga province. They stayed in the mining vil-
lage, where Lundin's private security personnel once were housed and they left the
camp in ruins. Id.
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declaration was later widely discredited as meritless. 29 Further, despite the
alleged force majeure still occurring, Lundin Holdings actively sought out
industrial partners for the concessions.30 In 2000, the 1996 deal between
Lundin Holdings and G6camines once again came under international scru-
tiny. In a U.N. sponsored report, a Panel of Experts determined that Lundin,
along with eighty-four other companies, had violated the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multina-
tional Corporations in relation to Lundin's mining activities. 3' The DRC's
Lutundula Commission, created under the transition government to review
over sixty mining contracts, called for a renegotiation or nullification of the
Lundin Holdings/Gdcamines contracts citing fraud, bribery, deception, and
possible illegal profiteering during the contract process.32
In 2002, Phelps Dodge, a major U.S. corporation, exercised an op-
tion where it acquired a seventy percent stake in Lundin Holdings. 33 Prior to
exercising the option, Phelps Dodge demanded the contract with Gdcamines
be re-negotiated, dropping the production output from one-hundred thou-
sand tonnes of copper and eight-thousand, six-hundred tonnes of cobalt an-
nually to thirty thousand tonnes of copper and two-thousand, eight-hundred
tonnes of cobalt annually, as well as reducing the initial fee from two-
hundred, fifty million dollars to fifty million dollars.34 Phelps Dodge and
G6camines renegotiated the Lundin Holdings/Gdcamines contract and the
parties split the ownership of the Tenke Fungurume concessions with
Phelps Dodge owning a 54.7% stake, Lundin Corp. owning 24.75%, and
G6camines owning 17.5%.35 Freeport-McMoran, another U.S. corporation,
29 Id.
30 Id. at 23.
31 See Final Report, supra note 4, at Annex IlI; The OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Corporations, 21 (rev. 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines] (In addressing bribery, the report states: "[E]nterprises
should not, directly or indirectly, offer, promise, give, or demand a bribe or other undue
advantage to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage. Nor should enterprises be
solicited or expected to render a bribe or other undue advantage.").
32 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 21; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, DR
Congo: End Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (Feb. 19, 2006), http://www.hrw.org/
en/news/2006/02/19/dr-congo-end-illegal-exploitation-natural-resources (last visited Sept.
11, 2009).
33 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 24-25.
34 Id. at 24 (The reduction of the initial fee meant from $250 million to $50 million meant
that the $50 million paid in 1997 was all that was paid for the concessions).
31 Id. at 28.
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bought out Phelps Dodge in 2006 for $25.9 billion, creating the world's
largest copper-trading firm.
36
The negotiations for the new deal took place behind closed doors
between representatives from Lundin, Phelps Dodge, the DRC Ministry of
Planning, and the Governor of Banque Centrale. 37 An influential U.S. Em-
38bassy officer, Melissa Sanderson, was also present via video conference.
G6camines objected to the new terms without the contract first going
through its Board of Directors, but those objections were ignored as Vice
President Jean-Pierre Bemba received approval from the Council of Minis-
ters (the DRC's parliament) on July 19, 2005. 3 9 Notably, the parties ap-
proved the contracts before a scheduled September 2005 audit funded by the
World Bank. The audit went forward and discovered many faults with a
large portion of contracts signed from the start of the civil war in 1996.40
Specifically, the audit noted "[t]he dimension of the assets to be transferred
to the companies by virtue of the contracts exceeds the norms of rational
and highest use of the mineral assets.",41 It also noted that the contract
process "was so flawed" with lack of transparency that the DRC "may not
have received the full value of the mines.
' 42
Construction at the Tenke Fungurume concessions commenced in
2006, with mining production set to commence in 2009. Since the construc-
tion required the relocation of some fifty-thousand indigenous people from
36 Press Release, Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold to Acquire Phelps Dodge, Creating
the World's Largest Publicly Traded Copper Company (Nov. 19, 2006), http://www.fcx.
corn/news/2006/l 11906.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
37 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 26.
38 See Dan Rather Reports, All Mine (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.hd.net/
transcript.html?airmaster-id=A5476. Melissa Sanderson's presence at the meeting is cited
as a strong point of controversy for many people. At the time, Sanderson was the Political
Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa. In an interview with Dan Rather, Peter Rosenblum,
a law professor at Columbia University, spoke about the influence Sanderson held within the
DRC alleging:
She's certainly well connected... when it comes to the government circles in the
Congo. She had access to everyone from top to bottom. I've been in meetings with
the Minister while she's called. She's got people's phone numbers. She's got
people's addresses. She's in their offices. She's calling. She's present.
Three months after convincing President Kabila to sign off on the new deal, San-
derson took a job at Freeport-McMoran as Vice President of Government Rela-
tions. Rosenblum also noted that the Congolese viewed Sanderson's efforts out of
the U.S. Embassy as tacit approval of the deal by the U.S. government.
Id.
39 CusTERs & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 27.
4' Id. at25.
41 Id. at 28.
42 Dan Rather Reports, supra note 38.
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their ancestral land, Freeport-McMoran promised the villagers it would
build houses for the displaced. 43 Yet more than nine months after the reloca-
tions had begun, villagers were still living in either canvas tents or out in the
open air and the new land was not cultivatable. 44 Furthermore, the resettled
villagers have reported clashes with other indigenous inhabitants over the
land.45 A spokesman for Freeport-McMoran tried to reconcile this by noting
that the "temporary tents [Freeport-McMoran] has donated are considered
an improvement to the traditional structures." 46
The amended contract thereafter became the subject of intense scru-
tiny. In January 2007, under the permanent government of Prime Minister
Antoine Gizenga, the DRC government established another Review Com-
mission.47 Under the Commission's initial review, the Gdcamines contract
was not on the list of contracts to be reviewed but was eventually added. 48 It
is unclear what prompted the addition of the G6camines contract to the re-
view. Eventually, a leaked transcript of the review revealed that the Com-
mission placed the Tenke contracts under the "less viable" category and
suggested that the contracts be renegotiated due to unforeseen irregularities
beyond what they had initially imagined.49 Even with these findings, Presi-
dent Kabila has already given assurances to Freeport-McMoran that the
contract would not be renegotiated. 0
An analysis of the situation involving the Tenke-Fungurume con-
cession demonstrates that Lundin Holdings and Freeport-McMoran were
involved in the pillaging of the DRC's natural resources, as far as pillaging
is defined under the ICC statute.5' This is because both companies, at one
point in time, appropriated the property for their own personal use, either by
seizing the physical or financial assets of the concessions.52 Both companies
43 id.
44 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 35-43.
45 Id. at 43 (quoting one villager as stating "We now have a conflict with the autochthon-
ous (sic) people [the original inhabitants] over the use of the only well. They don't want us to
take our water from this pit and they have taken the bucket to make this message clear.").
46 Interviews with local inhabitants dispute this claim. See, e.g., Dan Rather Reports, supra
note 38.
47 CusTERs & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 44 (citing Minister of Mines of the D.R.
Congo, Arretj Portant Mise Sur Pied de la Commission Ministgrielle Chargde de la Rdvisita-
tion des Contrats Miniers. Arrti Ministerial [Ministerial Decree on Setting Up of the Minis-
terial Committee of the Revisitation of the Mining Contracts], Doc. No.
2745/Cab.Min/Mines/01, (Apr. 20, 2007).
48 CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 45.
49 Id. at 46-47 (There were three categories: viable, less viable, and non-viable. The
Commission did not list any of the reviewed contracts under the viable category).
'o Id. at46.




appropriated the property without consent because the corruption and bri-
bery of state officials nullified any actual consent. Finally, the appropria-
tion took place during-and was associated with-an armed conflict. 54
III. PILLAGING
Pillaging is "all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in
armed conflict for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under
international law" and it is synonymous with the terms exploitation, pillage,
and plunder. 5 The actions of Lundin Holdings and Freeport-McMoran in
taking the Tenke-Fungurume concession amount to the crime of pillage
because it was an unlawful appropriation during and within the context of
an armed conflict.
The Rome Statute established the ICC's jurisdiction over genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. 56 Drafters of the Rome Statute
felt the need to "provide greater certainty and clarity concerning the content
of each crime" and commissioned a preparatory commission to draft the
Elements of War Crimes. 57 The Elements of War Crimes listed five ele-
ments of pillage as: (1) the perpetrator appropriated certain property; (2) the
perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and intended to
appropriate it for private or personal use; (3) the appropriation was without
the consent of the owner; (4) the conduct took place in the context of-and
53 id.
54 Id.
55 Prosecutor v. Kordid & Cerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, 352 (Feb. 26, 2001) (citing Prosecutor
v. Delalid, IT-96-2 1-T, Judgment, 591 (Nov. 16, 1998)). See also 10 UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS ON TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, TRIAL OF CARL KRAUCH AND
TWENTY-TWO OTHERS 1, 44 (1949) [hereinafter I.G. Farben Trial]. The declaration stated
that spoliation:
[H]as taken every sort of form, from open looting to the most cunningly camouf-
laged financial penetration, and it has extended to every sort of property-from
works of art to stocks of commodities, from bullion and banknotes to stocks and
shares in business and financial undertakings. But the object is always the same-to
seize everything of value that can be put to the aggressors' profit and then to bring
the whole economy of the subjugated countries under control so that they must en-
slave to enrich and strengthen their oppressors.
Id. See also Control Council Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, art. 2(1)(b) (1943), available at
http'//avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtlO.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2009); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1185 (8th ed. 2004).
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S
90, 92 [hereinafter ICC Statute]. See also Kiu'r DORMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND
COMMENTARY 1-2 (2003).
51 Id. at 2-3.
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was associated with-an international armed conflict; and (5) the perpetra-
tor was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an
armed conflict. 8
A. Appropriation of Certain Property by the Perpetrator
Under the first element, the property protected by the ban on appro-
priation "is not limited to civilian property as suggested by several delega-
tions [to the Rome Treaty]., 59 Although the term "appropriation" is not de-
fined under the Rome Statute or in the Elements of War Crimes, -it is -gener-
ally seen as the "exercise of control over property; a taking of possession." 6
Regarding natural resources, a perpetrator may take control of the property
through means such as extracting, exporting, and selling the natural re-
sources. There does not have to be any definite transfer of title in the prop-
erty. 61 Further, control over property can be done in a legal fashion (e.g., the
purchase of stock in a company), but, accompanied with the other elements,
it is pillage. 62
B. The Perpetrator Intended to Deprive the Owner of Property for
Personal Use
Under the second element, the perpetrator must have intended to
deprive the owner of the property and to appropriate it for private or person-
al use.63 The second element therefore breaks into two inquiries: (1) the
perpetrator intended to deprive the owner; and (2) the property was appro-
priated for private or personal use. The act of "depriv[ing] the owner" is not
defined under the ICC Statute but generally means "an act of taking
away."64 Additionally, the terms "private" and "personal" are not defined
but should be construed "broad[ly] enough to include cases where property
is given to third persons and not only used by the perpetrator.,
65
58 Id. at 272.
'9 Id. at 273.
60 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 55, at 110.
61 DORMANN, supra note 56, at 273.
62 See 10 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS ON TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, TRIAL OF ALFRIED FELIX ALWYN KRUPP VON BOHLEN UND HALBACH AND
ELEVEN OTHERS 69, 73 (1949); I.G. Farben Trial, supra note 55, at 50 (holding that defen-
dants were found guilty of spoliation (pillaging) of Polish companies even though they had
actually purchased the stocks of the companies legally. The courts analysis hinged on the
action taking place within the context of a conflict and the purchases being done under du-
ress thereby negating consent).
63 Not including military necessity.
64 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 55, at 473.
65 DORMANN, supra note 56, at 273.
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An argument exists that there is a third inquiry in the second ele-
ment. This inquiry addresses whether the property was taken as a military
necessity. 66 However, the Preparatory Commission decided against making
this inquiry part of the second element and instead inserted it as a foot-
note.67 The ICRC Elements of War Crimes notes that several delegations
wanted "pillage" defined as the appropriation or seizure of property not
justified by military necessity. 68 However, this definition has three weak-
nesses. First, the approach would not distinguish pillage from other statutes
already on the books.69 Second, "an element referring to military necessity
would introduce an extra element and create the result of permitting an
evaluation, whereas an absolute prohibition [against pillaging already] ex-
ists. ' '70 Finally, "a reference to military necessity would criminalize the tak-
ing of military equipment when no necessity could be shown for this, whe-
reas international humanitarian law allows the taking of war booty without
the need for justification.",71
C. The Appropriation Lacked Consent
Under the third element, the appropriation must be without the con-
sent of the owner. Consent is another term not specifically defined under the
ICC Statute for pillage, but the ICC Elements of Crime notes "[i]t is unders-
tood that 'genuine consent' does not include consent obtained through de-
ception., 72 Further, under the "War Crime of Rape" heading, the Elements
of Crime states, "[i]t is understood that a person may be incapable of giving
66 See Lundberg, supra note 8, at 510.
67 DORMANN, supra note 56, at 272-73.
68 Id. at 272 (quoting ICC Elements of Crime, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi) n.47 (2002), available at
http'//www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-ABOB-
68E5F9082543/0/Element of CrimesEnglish.pdf).
69 DORMANN, supra note 56, at 272 ("[T]his approach would have created difficulties in
distinguishing the crime of pillaging from the crimes defined under art. 8(2)(b)(xiii) [destroy-
ing or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively de-
manded by the necessities of war] and art. 8(2)(a)(iv) [extensive destruction and appropria-
tion of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wanton-
ly]."1).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 273 (The ICRC also comments that "it appears to be generally accepted now that
even war booty must be handed over to the authorities, i.e. cannot be taken for private or
personal use").
72 Lundberg, supra note 8, at 510 (citing ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 68, art.
7(1)(g)-5 n.20).
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genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity." 73
Consent under the pillaging statute should follow the same definitions. 74
D. The Appropriation Occurred in the Context of-and Was Asso-
ciated with-an Armed Conflict and the Perpetrator Was Aware of
the Armed Conflict
The fourth element inquires whether the conduct took place in the
context of-and was associated with-an armed conflict, and the fifth ele-
ment analyzes whether the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances
that established the existences of an armed conflict. These final two factors
are generally grouped together. For example, the ICC Elements of Crime
states:
There is no requirement for a legal evaluation by the perpetrator as to the
existence of an armed conflict or its character as international or non-
international; [i]n that context there is no requirement for awareness by the
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as in-
ternational or non-international; [t]here is only a requirement for the
awareness of the factual circumstances that established the existence of an
armed conflict that is implicit in the terms 'took place in the context of and
was associated with.75
In sum, it is not a requisite that a perpetrator evaluates the legal me-
rits of whether two groups are in the midst of an armed conflict or whether
the conflict can be termed international or intra-national. An awareness of
the facts that creates those characteristics is enough to establish that the
appropriation occurred in the context of-and was associated with-an
armed conflict.
IV. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
There are two ways to commit a crime: one can actually commit the
offence charged or one can aid and abet the perpetrator. 76 Similarly, there
73 Lundberg, supra note 8, at 510 (citing ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 68, art.
8(2)(b)(xxii)-I n.51).
74 The element of consent produces a problem when corporations contract with rebels,
state, or local officials to extract the minerals as in the current example. However, it is gener-
ally held that parties cannot assent to a contract (give consent) when there is fraud in the
inducement (like this case) or the parties were under duress, coercion, or intimidation. See
generally MICHAEL BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE
UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 153 (3rd ed. 2005)
(citing American, English, German, French, and Italian treatises).
75 Lundberg, supra note 8, at 510 (citing ICC Elements of Crime, supra note 68, art. 8).
76 See, e.g., Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 55 (establishing criminal liability for
an individual who was "an accessory to the crime, took a consenting part therein, was con-
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are three variances to complicity under which one is liable for aiding and
abetting: direct complicity, indirect complicity, and silent complicity. 7" Di-
rect complicity is the active giving of criminal assistance and is the easiest
to spot and attach criminal liability. Under "giving of criminal assistance,"
the perpetrator does not need to intend to do harm; having the knowledge
that the foreseeable harmful effects could occur suffices. 78 Further, accom-
plices are complicit in a crime even when no principal has been convicted of
the original crime or when the identity of the principal is not known; the
accomplice does not even need to desire for the crime to occur.79 "As a re-
sult, anyone who knowing of another's criminal purpose, voluntarily aids
him or her in it, can be convicted of complicity even though he regretted the
outcome of the offence.",
80
Indirect complicity is any action that has a substantial effect on the
crime, even though the defendant may have had no direct role. 8' For exam-
ple, indirect complicity has been found for knowingly contributing money
to the Nazi regime, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant had no con-
trol over the Nazi's organization.82 Silent complicity, however, is generally
found from omissions alone. "The notion of silent complicity reflects the
expectation on [defendants] that they raise systematic or continuous human
rights abuses with the appropriate authorities. [I]t reflects the growing ac-
ceptance ... that there is something culpable about failing to exercise influ-
ence in such circumstances.,
83
nected with plans or enterprises involving its commission, or was a member of any organiza-
tion or group connected with the commission of any such crime"); Statute of the Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia art. 7(1), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192;
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 995, art. 6(1), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
77 Andrew Clapham & Scott Jerbi, Categories of Corporate Complicity in Human Rights
Abuses, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 339, 341 (2001).
78 Id. at 342.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 539 (Sept. 2, 1998))
(emphasis added).
81 See generally 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS ON TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, TRIAL OF BRUNO TESCH AND Two OTHERS 93 (1947) [hereinafter Zyklon B
Trials].
82 9 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS ON TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
TRIAL OF FRIEDRICH FLICK, (1947) [hereinafter Flick Trial] (The NMT even acknowledged
that it was unthinkable that the defendant would be willing to be a party to the mass atrocities
committed by the Nazi regime).
83 Clapham, supra note 77, at 347. See also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-
T, 477, 548 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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The Nuremberg Tribunals clearly affirmed the concepts of criminal
responsibility for war crimes following World War 11. 84 Following this
precedent and other precedent from international tribunals and the Interna-
tional Law Commission, Article 25 of the Rome Statute outlines the ICC's
jurisdiction over criminals. 85 The ICC can exercise jurisdiction over natural
persons who commit a crime under the jurisdiction of the court, either indi-
vidually or jointly, if they order, solicit, or induce the commission of a
crime and that crime is attempted or actually occurs. 86 Additionally, juris-
diction can be exercised over people that aid, abet, or otherwise assist in the
commission or attempted commission of a crime, including providing the
means for its commission, or by contributing to a group acting with a com-
mon purpose. 87 Since the statute only recognizes "natural persons," corpora-
tions are free to operate in the midst of international and intra-national con-
flicts and free to aid and abet the pillaging of natural resources.
The Rome Statute does not recognize corporations as natural per-
sons. 88 However, the Rome Statute follows the lead of the Nuremberg trials
and provides the ICC with jurisdiction over the individual directors and
officers who lead corporations to commit or aid in the commission of war
crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity. 89 Applying the precedents of
Nuremberg-and those of later tribunals-to the Tenke-Fungurume conces-
sions, it is possible to hold officers of Lundin Holdings and Freeport-
McMoran liable for the pillaging of natural resources in the DRC. But cur-
rently the Rome Statute enables corporations to avoid criminal responsibili-
ty for aiding and abetting pillaging, and is therefore inadequate.
Since individual criminal liability is firmly established, Part A will
briefly discuss the criminal liability of corporate directors and officers be-
84 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 192-93 (1948) (The International
Military Tribunal Charter "presupposes the existence of a system of international law under
which individuals are responsible to the community of nations for violations of rules of in-
ternational criminal law."). See also Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Rec-
ognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1,
at 188 (1946) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution] (affirming the principles set out in the Nurem-
berg trials).
85 ICC Statute, supra note 56, art. 25.
86 id.
87 Id. ("Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either: (i) [b]e made with the aim
of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or
purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) [b]e
made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.").
88 See infra Part IV(B).
89 ICC Statute, supra note 56; I.G. Farben Trial, supra note 55 (convicting I.G. Farben
executives involved in constructing slave-labor factory at Auschwitz); Flick Trial, supra note




fore Part B fully discusses corporate liability under the Rome Statute's cur-
rent grant ofjurisdiction.
A. Individual Criminal Liability
1. The perpetrator
"[Individuals] whose conduct is directly covered by the definition
of the crime and who acts with the requisite mens rea 'commits a crime as
an individual' in terms of Article 25(3)(a) ... and is clearly liable as a prin-
cipal under international criminal law." 90 If several people act together in
committing a crime under international law, each one is individually re-
sponsible for the crime. 9' By applying this theory of liability to the elements
of pillage, the directors and officers of Lundin and Freeport-McMoran can
be tried as principal actors in pillaging because the directors and officers (1)
appropriated the Tenke-Fungurume concessions; (2) deprived the owner of
benefits; (3) lacked consent to make the appropriation; and (4) were aware
of the conflict occurring in the DRC.
First, when the directors of Lundin first took part in the Tenke-
Fungurume concessions, they appropriated the concessions by taking con-
trol of them. They took control not only of the financial benefits in acquir-
ing the concession rights away from Grcamines, but also by exercising
physical control of the mine. 92 Exercising this control satisfies the first ele-
ment that the perpetrator appropriated certain property. Both parts of the
second element can also be met. The directors, by choosing not to start pro-
duction, deprived the owner of the benefits that could have existed. There is
evidence that the directors were waiting, and did wait, for the price of cop-
per and cobalt to rise before selling the mine, thus using the mine for their
own personal use.93 Third, the appropriation was without consent because
the bribery and deception used to obtain the approval for the purchase of the
mines nullifies the willingness of the consent. 94 Finally, with regard to the
last two elements, it would be hard for the directors of Lundin Holdings to
90 Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 953, 958 (2007).
91 Id. ("[Eivery co-perpetrator is responsible for the acts of all the other co-perpetrators,
which means that every co-perpetrator is responsible for the whole crime committed within
the framework of the common plan.").
92 See supra text accompanying note 18. Remember, one can acquire property through
appropriate legal means, but if that acquisition is accompanied by the requisite criminal
intent to commit the war crime of pillaging, then it is a crime.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30 (by declaring a force majeure, Lundin guar-
anteed that no one would receive profits from the mine as no production would take place
under the clause).
94 See supra text accompanying note 22.
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argue that they were unaware of the conflict going on in the DRC. This is
shown by the contacts made with the AFDL before the AFDL had signed
the final contract as Lundin Holdings was unsure of who exactly would be
in control of the country.
95
As for the directors and officers of Freeport-McMoran, one could
look to the closed-door meeting where no representatives of G~camines
were present and Freeport-McMoran walked out with a sweetheart deal as
evidence of pillage. 96 Gdcamines lost almost twenty-five percent of its con-
trol over the Tenke Fungurume concessions. Both the physical property and
the monetary value of the concessions were appropriated by Freeport-
McMoran, Freeport-McMoran's directors intended to deprive G6camines of
the property for their own personal use, the appropriations occurred without
the consent of G~camines, and it is arguable that the appropriations were in
connection with an armed conflict.
2. The complicit accomplice
Directors and officers may also be charged with aiding and abetting
in the commission of war crimes. 97 In 1950, the International Law Commis-
sion ratified this theory based on the principles derived at Nuremberg:
"Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a crime under interna-
tional law.",
98
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has what is widely believed to the best interpretation of the requisite
actus reus and mens rea needed to attach liability for aiding and abetting. 99
In Prosecutor v. Furundija, the ICTY held that the actus reus for aiding
and abetting "requires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral sup-
port, which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.''l° Un-
der the mens rea requirement, the court held that "mere knowledge that [the
defendant's] actions assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime is
sufficient to constitute mens rea in aiding and abetting the crime."' 0 ' Fur-
thermore, the court found that:
9' See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
97 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, 1T-94-1-T, Judgment, 679 (May 7, 1997) ("[P]articipation in
the commission of the crime does not require an actual physical presence or physical assis-
tance appears to have been well accepted at the Nirnberg war crimes trials.. .
98 U.N. Resolution, supra note 84.





[I]t is not necessary for an aider and abettor to meet all the requirements of
mens rea for a principal perpetrator. In particular, it is not necessary that
he shares and identifies with the principal's criminal will and purpose,
provided that his own conduct was with knowledge. That conduct may in
itself be perfectly lawful; it becomes criminal only when combined with
the principal's unlawful conduct. 1
02
Since determining the requisite mens rea of an aider and abettor is
generally the more controversial analysis, the Furundlija court questioned
whether to apply a purpose test or knowledge test. 0 3 Under a purpose test,
the defendant has to share the mens rea of the principal. 104 Under a know-
ledge test, it is sufficient that the defendant knew crimes were being com-
mitted with his assistance to establish mens rea. 1
05
After its analysis, the Furund;ija court expressly dismissed the
purpose test:
The [ ] analysis leads the Trial Chamber to the conclusion that it is not ne-
cessary for the accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the
sense of positive intention to commit the crime. Instead, the clear require-
ment in the vast majority of the cases is for the accomplice to have know-
102 Id. 243 (emphasis added).
103 Id. 236-44 (analyzing historical and international legal documents such as the Inter-
national Law Commission's Draft Code on Crimes and Offences Against Mankind and the
Rome Statute creating the ICC).
104 See generally United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), reprinted in 14
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 308, 622 (1949). The case stated:
The real question is, is it a crime to make a loan, knowing or having good reason
to believe that the borrower will us[e] the funds in financing enterprises
which are employed in using labor in violation of either national or international
law?... Loans or sales of commodities to be used in an unlawful enterprise may
well be condemned from a moral standpoint and reflect no credit on the part of the
lender or seller.., but the transaction can hardly be said to be a crime.
Id.
105 See generally Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 238 (Dec. 10, 1998),
citing Zyklon B Trials, supra note 81 ("[T]he prosecution did not attempt to prove that the
accused acted with the intention of assisting the killing of the internees. It was accepted that
their purpose was to sell insecticide to the SS (for profit, that is a lawful goal pursued by
lawful means). The charge as accepted by the court was that they knew what the buyer in fact
intended to do with the product they were supplying."). See also Furundija, IT-95-17/1-T,
218 (quoting Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen), 4 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10 (1949)) ("The defendant knew that executions were taking place. He admitted that the
procedure which determined the so-called guilt of a person which resulted in him being
condemned to death was 'too summary'. But, there is no evidence that he ever did anything
about it. As the second highest ranking officer in the Kommando, his views could have been
heard in complaint or protest against what he now says was a too summary procedure, but he
chose to let the injustice go uncorrected.").
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ledge that his actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the
crime. This is particularly apparent from all the cases in which persons
were convicted for having driven victims and perpetrators to the site of an
execution. In those cases the prosecution did not prove that the driver
drove for the purpose of assisting in the killing, that is, with an intention to
kill. It was the knowledge of the criminal purpose of the executioners that
rendered the driver liable as an aider and abettor. Consequently, if it were
not proven that a driver would reasonably have known that the purpose of
the trip was an unlawful execution, he would be acquitted.
Moreover, it is not necessary that the aider and abettor should know the
precise crime that was intended and which in the event was committed. If
he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed,
and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate
the commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.
Knowledge is also the requirement in the International Law Commission
Draft Code, which may well reflect the requirement of mens rea in custo-
mary international law. This is the standard adopted by this Tribunal in the
Tadi6 Judgement, although sometimes somewhat misleadingly expressed
as "intent".
One exception to this requirement of knowledge is the Rohde case, which
appears to require no mens rea at all. However, this case is based on Eng-
lish law and procedure under the Royal Warrant. Furthermore, it is out of
line with the other British cases, which do require knowledge. At the other
end of the scale is the appeal court decision in the Hechingen Deportation
case, which required that the accomplice share the mens rea of the perpe-
trator. However, the high standard proposed by this case is not reflected in
the other cases.
In sum, the Trial Chamber holds the legal ingredients of aiding and abet-
ting in international criminal law to be the following: the actus reus con-
sists of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime. The mens rea required
is the knowledge that these acts assist the commission of the offence. This
notion of aiding and abetting is to be distinguished from the notion of
common design, where the actus reus consists of participation in a joint
criminal enterprise and the mens rea required is intent to participate. 1
06
1o6 See Prosecutor v. Furund2ija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 245-49 (Dec. 10, 1998).
Though this Note is only focused on the pillaging of natural resources, it should be noted that
according to this interpretation, corporations and its officers could be held liable for every
single war crime that is committed against the civilians in the DRC. The court's broad state-
ment "If he is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of
those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime,
and is guilty as an aider and abettor" would open up liability for the raping of women and
children, the use of child soldiers, the wanton destruction of public and private property, etc.
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In upholding this standard, international tribunals have "held defen-
dants liable for aiding and abetting where [the defendants] knowingly
carr[ied] out acts comprising practical assistance, encouragement or moral
support to the principal." 107 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) has found that aiding and abetting are disjunctive, and one only
needs to prove one type of participation to be found guilty.108
Therefore, under customary international law, the three elements
required to find liability for aiding and abetting are: (1) the occurrence of a
war crime or a crime against humanity; (2) an accomplice's material contri-
bution to such crime(s); and (3) evidence that the accomplice had intent that
the crime would be committed or was reckless as to its commission. "0 It is
important to note that under the first element the principal offender "need
not be charged or convicted for the liability of the accomplice to be estab-
lished."" 0 In regard to the second element, ICTY case law requires that
contributions from accomplices "must meet a qualitative and quantitative
threshold."'. The tribunal requires the assistance to be substantial enough
such that the "act most probably would not have occurred in the same way
had not someone acted in the role that the accused in fact assumed."' 12 Un-
der the third element, the ICTY has noted that "there is a requirement of
intent, which of course involves awareness of the act of participation
coupled with a conscious decision to participate by planning, instigating,
ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the commission of
a crime." ' 13 Knowledge can be constructively inferred by a court if the sur-
rounding events are so overwhelming that it would be impossible to not
know of the events, and the accomplice continued their participation in the
enterprise. 114
107 Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 and Joki6, IT-02-60, Judgment, 726 (Jan. 17, 2005). See also
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 484 (Sept. 2, 1998) (holding that aiding
means giving support to the perpetrator, while abetting means facilitating the commission of
the crime by being sympathetic to the perpetrator). See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Ruzindana, ICTR-95- I -T, Judgment, 197 (May 21, 1999).
108 Id.
109 William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accom-
plices, 42 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 439 (2001), reprinted in WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
ESSAYS ON THE DEATH PENALTY, JUSTICE, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 495, 501 (2008).
110 Schabas,supra note 109, at 501.
1" Id. at 502.
112 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadi6, IT-94-I-T, Judgment, 679 (May 7, 1997)). It should be
noted, however, that the drafters of the ICC chose not to include the text "substantial" in
Article 25 which may signal that aiding and abetting liability should not have to reach that
high of a threshold. See Schabas, supra note 109, at 502.
113 Schabas, supra note 109, at 503 (citing Tadi6, IT-94-1-T, 674).
14 See Tadi6, IT-94-1-T, 674.
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Unfortunately, drafters of the Rome Statute used wording that has
confused some as to whether a knowledge test or a purpose test applies.
Under Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, a defendant is liable if he or
she,"fflor the purpose offacilitating the commission of such a crime, aids,
abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission,
including providing the means for its commission."' 15 This purpose stan-
dard goes against what the ICTY/ICTR had determined was the proper in-
terpretation. 116 There is no record as to why the drafters of the statutes re-
versed course on the test, but it is a decision that reversed the trend in cus-
tomary international law and may have taken away a valuable tool from
prosecutors at the ICC. 117
However, because there is no "legislative" history deciphering why
the drafters of the Rome Statute used the phrase "[fjor the purpose of facili-
tating," or what elements make up purpose, the ICC would need to look at
customary international law interpretations on aiding and abetting crimes.
The ICC should consider the cases such as Furundija18 and the Zykion B
case 1 19 to determine that knowledge of a crime's commission is sufficient
under international criminal law to attach liability for aiding and abetting.
To hold otherwise would have two disturbing effects: (1) the doctrine of
aiding and abetting liability would basically disappear and all violations
would need to meet the tougher requirements for joint criminal enterprise
(i.e., finding common purposes); and (2) defendants that fund but do not
physically involve themselves in devastating wars would enjoy an implicit
immunity from international criminal law. In Prosecutor v. Tadi6, the ICTY
held:
Although only some members of [a] group may physically perpetrate [a]
criminal act (murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, etc.), the participation and contribution of the other members of
the group is often vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in
question. It follows that the moral gravity of such participation is often no
less-or indeed no different-from that of those actually carrying out the
acts in question. 120
If the ICC recognizes that the knowledge test is the proper test for
determining the culpability of an aider and abettor, then the officers and
directors of Lundin Holdings are liable for aiding and abetting the AFDL in
115 ICC Statute, supra note 56, art. 25(3)(c) (emphasis added).
116 See supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
117 See Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189,198-200 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
11 See Prosecutor v. Furundlija, IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998).
119 See Zyklon B Trials, supra note 81.
120 Prosecutor v. Tadi6, IT-94-I-T, Judgment, T 191 (May 7, 1997).
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the pillaging the Tenke-Fungurume concessions because (1) a war crime
occurred; (2) Lundin Holdings made a material contribution to the crime;
and (3) Lundin Holdings intended or was reckless as to the crime's
commission.
The first step of proving that the directors of Lundin Holdings aided
and abetted the AFDL is to prove that a war crime had in fact occurred; the
AFDL's pillage of the Katanga province would be sufficient. The AFDL
appropriated property throughout the DRC, especially in the Katanga prov-
ince that includes the Tenke-Fungurume concessions.12 1 The intent of the
AFDL was to deprive the use of the resources from the current government
of President Seko and to sell off the concessions for their own financial
gain. 122 The appropriation of the mine was without the consent of the own-
er, as it was taken by force. 123 Additionally, the conduct took place in the
context of an international conflict, and the AFDL knew the circumstances
establishing the existence of the conflict. 1
24
The second step to prove Lundin Holdings directors' accomplice
liability is that there was a material act on the part of Lundin Holdings that
contributed to the perpetration of the crime. Lundin Holdings had estab-
lished contacts with the AFDL in early 1997, before it took control of the
DRC.125 Within days or weeks of the AFDL gaining power, the two sides
finalized a deal that sent twenty-five million dollars to a company owned by
then AFDL leader Laurent Kabila. 12 6 A U.N. report noted that, inter alia,
this deal allowed for not only the continuation of the war, but also the con-
tinuation of the pillaging of minerals out of the DRC. i
2 7
The third and final step to demonstrate Lundin Holdings directors'
accomplice liability is to show that Lundin Holdings intended that the
crimes be committed or that Lundin Holdings was reckless as to the com-
mission of the crime(s). Directors of Lundin Holdings knowingly entered
into contacts with the AFDL prior to when the AFDL had control over the
121 See supra text accompanying note 25. The Katanga province was one of the top priori-
ties for the AFDL to control as it was rich in mineral resources. See CUSTERS & NORDBRAND,
supra note 16, at 21.
122 See UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE
ILLEGAL EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND OTHER FORMs OF WEALTH OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, U.N. Doc. S/2001/357, 26 (Apr. 12, 2001) [herei-
nafter U.N. REPORT].
123 See CUSTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 20.
124 The AFDL would not be able to effectively argue this element as they were the aggres-
sors in the conflict.
125 CusTERS & NORDBRAND, supra note 16, at 20-21.
126 Id. at 20.
127 See U.N. REPORT, supra note 122, 212 (finding one link between the exploitation of
resources and continuation of the war was "the will of private citizens and businesses who
endeavour to sustain the war for political, financial or other gains").
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Katanga province, which housed the Tenke-Fungurume concessions. Sure-
ly, the AFDL had to know of the possible lucrative contracts available if it
took control of the mines, and then, after gaining control, Lundin Holdings
transferred twenty-five million dollars to AFDL leader Kabila's compa-
ny. 128 Furthermore, under the theory of constructive intent, Lundin Holdings
was at least reckless to what was happening with the donations it gave to the
AFDL. 1
29
Since the directors and officers are liable under accomplice liability,
once they are punished then justice would normally be considered served. 130
However, by only focusing on the liability of directors and officers, the in-
ternational community is allowing corporations to walk away with billions
of dollars in profits. The ability to keep profits obtained from the pillaging
of natural resources does nothing to deter future pillaging by other
corporations.
B. Corporate Liability Under the Current ICC Statute
A shortfall of the Rome Statute is that it makes no jurisdictional
grant over corporations. Consequently, even if the directors and officers are
all held liable and found guilty, the DRC is still left with no recourse to re-
gain the pillaged resources. Professor William Schabas, Director of the Irish
Centre for Human Rights and former member of the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, sums up the impunity of corporations:
[T]o date, private sector actors, such as transnational corporations, have
been highly invisible in armed conflict, fueling war and atrocity, yet oper-
ating deep within the shadows and often from remote and privileged envi-
ronments. At best, they are conceptualized as secondary participants in in-
ternational crimes, in a world where impunity, amnesty and immunity en-
sure that even the central architects of systematic human rights violations
are still about as likely to be held accountable as they are to be struck by
lightning. 3'
128 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
129 See generally Mauthausen Concentration Camp Trial (Trial of Hans Alfuldisch and Six
Others), in 11 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM'N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS: THE DACHAU CONCENTRATION CAMP TRIAL, TRIAL OF MARTIN GOTTFRIED WEISS
AND THIRTY-NINE OTHERS 15 (1949). See also Prosecutor v. Tadi6, 1T-94-1-T, Judgment,
676 (May 7, 1997).
130 See generally Zyklon B Trials, supra note 81; Flick Trial, supra note 82; I.G. Farben
Trial, supra note 55.
131 William A. Schabas, War Economies, Economic Actors and International Criminal
Law, reprinted in WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 109, at 511, 512.
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To further complicate prosecution of these "private sector actors,"
the ICC's statute only gives the court jurisdiction over "natural persons."' 132
"Natural persons" are human beings that are subject to physical laws, and
corporations fall under a category that is considered "legal persons." 133 Cor-
porations, as legal persons, can own property, sue and be sued in civil
courts, be the defendant in domestic criminal cases, and exercise other
attributes belonging to a natural person. However, the prevailing interna-
tional norm is not to view corporations as criminal defendants. In Prosecu-
tor v. Akayesu, the ICTR explained:
[C]omplicity is borrowed criminality (criminalit6 d'emprunt). In other
words, the accomplice borrows the criminality of the principal perpetrator.
By borrowed criminality, it should be understood that the physical act
which constitutes the act of complicity does not have its own inherent cri-
minality, but rather it borrows the criminality of the act committed by the
principal perpetrator of the criminal enterprise. Thus, the conduct of the
accomplice emerges as a crime when the crime has been consummated by
the principal perpetrator. The accomplice has not committed an autonom-
ous crime, but has merely facilitated the criminal enterprise committed by
another. 134
This school of thought has allowed corporations to act with impuni-
ty under international law. One U.S. judge has noted, "[v]iewing aiding and
abetting in this way, as a theory of identifying who was involved in an of-
fense committed by another rather than as an offense in itself, also helps to
explain why a private actor may be held responsible for aiding and abetting
the violation of a norm."1
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However, the emerging trend under current international law with
regards to criminal liability of corporations is much different. At the Se-
venth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treat-
ment of Offenders of 1985, the General Assembly held that "[d]ue consid-
eration should be given by Member States to making criminally responsible
not only those persons who have acted on behalf of an institution, corpora-
tion or enterprise, or who are in a policy-making or executive capacity, but
also the institution, corporation or enterprise itself, by devising appropriate
measures that could prevent or sanction the furtherance of criminal activi-
132 ICC Statute, supra note 56, art. 25(1).
133 Schabas, supra note 131, at 517 (many domestic countries do not prosecute corporations
in criminal proceedings and therefore including it in the ICC's jurisdiction was unrealistic at
the time).
134 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 528 (Sept. 2, 1998).
135 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 281 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
2009]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ties." 13 6 Similarly, the Council of Europe ratified the Convention on the
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law which stated "[e]ach
Party shall adopt such appropriate measures as may be necessary to enable
it to impose criminal or administrative sanctions or measures on legal per-
sons on whose behalf an offence... has been committed by their organs or
by members thereof or by another representative."' 137 Other treaties and
conventions also call for criminal sanctions against corporations where
possible, including the 1997 OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign Pub-
lic Officials, 138 the 1999 U.N. Convention on Financing of Terrorism, 139 and
the 2000 U.N. Convention on Transnational Organized Crime.'40
Even with these progressions in corporate liability, the drafters of
the Rome Statute were unable to come to a consensus as to whether corpo-
rations would fall under the ICC's jurisdiction. ' 4 ' The French were the main
driving force for inclusion, considering it imperative when implementing
restitution and compensation. 142 Nevertheless, several countries, such as
Switzerland, Russia, and Japan, were strongly opposed to subjecting corpo-
rations to criminal liability. 143 They argued that the addition of entities to
the jurisdiction of the ICC "would have had far-reaching consequences for
the question of complementarity" since they did not already "provide for the
criminal responsibility of legal entities" in their own countries.'4 Due to
time restrictions, the latter argument won out and entities were not included
in the ICC's jurisdiction. 141
The ICC's inability to punish corporations with criminal sanctions
leaves victims of pillaging to either (1) try to renegotiate the contracts so
136 UNITED NATIONS, SEVENTH UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME
AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CRIME PREVENTION AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORDER(ANNEX), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/19 (Apr. 15, 1985).
137 Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, Doe. No.
ETS 172 (Nov. 4, 1998).
138 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions art. 2, Nov. 21, 1997, OECD Doe. DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, available at
httpJ/www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doe.nsf/LinkTo/daffe-ime-br(97)20 (last visited Sept. 11,
2009).
19 G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Feb. 25, 2000).
140 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 10, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doe.
A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 8, 2001).
141 See Saland, supra note 117, at 199.
142 E. VAN SLIEDREGT, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUALS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 66 (2003) (noting that "the French were also the driv-
ing force behind the acceptance of the concept of criminal organizations in Nuremberg.").





that the corporations do not exploit the resources without providing fair
benefit to the DRC; or (2) sue the corporation in the corporation's home
state. However, both options fail in addressing the need to deter corpora-
tions from assisting in pillage.
The first option of renegotiating the contracts fails for several rea-
sons. First, corporations such as Freeport-McMoran have publicly stated
that they refuse to renegotiate what they see as binding contracts. Further,
even if the contract is rescinded, it does not necessarily deter future beha-
vior by other corporations.
The second option of suing the corporation in its home state is also
inadequate. Citizens of the DRC may have a claim under a statute like the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) or similar statutes in other countries.
"[H]uman rights activist have made significant progress in promoting their
agendas with instruments such as the [ATCA]. However, efforts to apply a
kind of universal jurisdiction before civil courts have faced considerable
legal obstacles in many legal systems, the common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens being perhaps the most important of them.' ' 147 The indigen-
ous people of the DRC are ill-informed of the functioning of their own court
systems, much less that of a foreign nation. Depending on activist groups to
file lawsuits is not an adequate response to pillaging because many activist
groups are understaffed or underfunded. Additionally, the defendant corpo-
ration might be in a state where there is no available remedy. 148 Finally, the
outcome of the case would largely depend on the country where the case is
brought. If the country is one where aggressive business practices are ac-
cepted and/or encouraged, courts will be far less likely to rule against the
corporation.
V. SOLUTIONS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The international community must hold corporations liable for their
crimes, and a two-step process is needed to achieve punishment. First, there
must be a paradigm shift in the way the international community recognizes
corporations and corporate criminal activity. Achieving this shift will enable
the international community to amend the ICC's jurisdiction statute to rec-
ognize corporations as entities that are liable for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.
146 Dan Rather Reports, supra note 38.
147 Schabas, supra note 109, at 509.
148 The Lundin Group at the time was incorporated in Bermuda. See Final Report, supra
note 4, Annex III.
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A. The Paradigm Shift
The main argument against the inclusion of corporations under the
jurisdiction of the ICC centers on the historic classification of the corpora-
tion as a "legal person" and not a "natural person."' 149 This argument, how-
ever, places emphasis on the wrong classification. The emphasis should be
placed solely on the act committed.
[I]t should be clear that just as the forest is not itself a full-fledged biologi-
cal entity, so the corporation is not a full-fledged person. [Corporations]
do[ ] act in some sense of that term, but its acts are vicarious ones, and its
personhood is thus greatly restricted. But... this agency is not restricted
to such an extent that moral appraisal of this action is ruled out. There are
actions of the corporation which can be morally blameworthy even though
the corporation's agency status is much more restricted than full-fledged
moral agents. 1
50
Edwin H. Sutherland, an influential criminologist, noted that "[a]n
unlawful act is not defined as criminal by the fact that it is punished but by
the fact that it is punishable."' 15' Whether an act is punishable, then, merely
comes down to a political decision subject to ethical and political influ-
ences. Sutherland goes on to note how it was the upper-class people, gener-
ally those running the corporations, that influenced the current legal defini-
tions that people now feel required to follow:
White collar criminals [along with corporations] are relatively immune be-
cause of the class bias of the courts and the power of their class to influ-
ence the implementation and administration of the law. This class bias af-
fects not merely present-day courts, but also, to a much greater degree, af-
fected the earlier courts which established the precedents and rules of pro-
cedure of the present-day courts. Consequently, it is justifiable to interpret
the actual or potential failures in conviction in the light of known facts re-
garding the pressures brought to bear on the agencies which deal with
offenders. 1
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Refocusing on the criminal act itself will shift the paradigm and al-
low the international community to hold corporations accountable for facili-
149 See Ronald C. Slye, Corporations, Veils, and International Criminal Liability, 33
BROOKLYN J. INT'L LAW 955 (2008) (providing a complete analysis of the arguments raised
against corporate liability).
150 Larry May, Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL. STUD. 69, 74
(1983).
151 EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 35 (1949).
152 Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, 5 AMER. SOC. REV. 1 (1940), reprinted
in WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINAL: THE OFFENDER IN BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS 40, 46 (Gil-
bert Geis ed., 1968). See also EDWIN SCHUR, THE POLITICS OF DEVIANCE 183 (1980).
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tating pillage. Indeed, the trend in international law of personifying corpora-
tions shows that this paradigm shift is acceptable. Analyzing "soft" law
agreements pertinent to corporations yields insight as to how the interna-
tional community already personifies corporations as having the rights and
obligations of a natural person. 153 For example, the preamble of the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights declares "every individual and every or-
gan of society. . .shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect
for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and obser-
vance." 154 Other non-binding international organizations, such as the
OECD, 155 the International Labour Organization, 56 and the Copenhagen
Declaration for Social Development 157 also personify corporations as hav-
ing legal obligations akin to human beings. Given the personification of
corporations as natural persons in these soft law agreements and interna-
tional organizations, the international community is ready for a paradigm
shift.
By shifting the paradigm from "who" commits crime to "what" ac-
tions are punishable, the international community can enforce criminal
sanctions against corporations. Punishment for crimes, such as pillaging,
153 See David. Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human
Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L. L. 931, 947
(2004). See also Truth and Reconciliation Comm'n of South Africa, Report, ch. 2 (1998),
available at http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/trc/2_5.pdf (describing the Commis-
sion's rejection of claims by business leaders of innocence based on their non-state status).
l-4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(ml), pmbl., U.N. GAOR,
3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 8, 1948) (emphasis added).
155 OECD Guidelines, supra note 31, at 39 (recognizing the role corporations play in hu-
man rights).
156 International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (rev. Nov. 2000), 83 ILO OFF. BULL. (ser. A),
No. 3 (2000), available at http'J/www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed-emp/---empent/
documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2009) ("All the parties con-
cerned by this Declaration should respect the sovereign rights of States, obey the national
laws and regulations, give due consideration to local practices and respect relevant interna-
tional standards. They should respect the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
corresponding International Covenants adopted by the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions.").
157 See World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen Declaration on Social Devel-
opment, 26(j), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995) ("Promote universal respect for, and ob-
servance and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, including the
right to development; promote the effective exercise of rights and the discharge of responsi-
bilities at all levels of society; promote equality and equity between women and men; protect
the rights of children and youth; and promote the strengthening of social integration and civil
society.").
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could take on many forms from penalties that would go to compensation of
the victims to sanctions on the corporations. 1
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B. Amendment of the ICC Statute
Article 121 (1) of the Rome Statute allows parties to make proposed
amendments for the ICC seven years after the entry into force of the treaty;
July 1, 2009 was the seven year mark to propose amendments. 159 Therefore,
this Note recommends that the international community amend Article
25(1) so that it reads:
The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural and legal persons pursuant
to this Statute.
Making this amendment will ensure that the ICC has jurisdiction
over corporations, businesses, and industries that commit or assist in the
perpetration of crimes such as pillaging.
There are two separate theories for imposing corporate criminal lia-
bility: identification and imputation. 160 The claim under identification is that
the acts of certain individuals should be inferred as the actual acts of the
corporation. 161 This establishes direct liability of the corporation. Of course,
the ICC or international community would have to curtail this liability to
include only those individuals who have a responsibility to represent the
company to ensure that a whole corporation could not incur criminal liabili-
ty based on the actions of a single actor. 162
The theory of imputation is also known as vicarious liability. Under
imputation, the corporation becomes liable for the acts of its employees.
The relationship between the employee and the corporation is very impor-
tant since the employee must act within the scope of his or her employment
to impute criminal liability to the corporation.' 63 Imputation is a much
broader theory, as well as less accepted, than identification, since imputa-
tion is much harder to reconcile with criminal law's concept of personal
158 Sanctions on a corporation can be applied much like terms of probation are placed on
people.
159 ICC Statute, supra note 56, art. 121.
160 Both theories would in some form eventually affect the shareholder and the value of the
corporation. The effect of criminal liability should merely be one of the factors that stock
buyers consider when purchasing stock. This in turn should provide more oversight in the
actions of the corporation.
161 James Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 KY. L.J. 73
(1976).
162 A useful example of a statute incorporating the identification theory is found in the U.S.
Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4) (1962).
163 See, e.g., id
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guilt. 164 Since the theory of imputation is more limited, establishing corpo-
rate liability through identification may be the better approach and more
acceptable to dissenting countries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Businesses have long operated in countries that are in the midst of
international conflicts or civil wars. The overwhelming majority of busi-
nesses have done so while conforming to international legal standards and
respecting human rights. However, corporations exist that violate interna-
tional law. For example, these corporations may resort to bribery and cor-
ruption to win government contracts and then force indigenous people off
their land and pillage their natural resources, much like what happened with
the Lundin Group.
The pillaging of natural resources is a significant problem that pla-
gues countries like the DRC. Soldiers and political leaders commit these
actions, but corporations and other entities are also responsible. Historically,
the international community created international criminal tribunals to pu-
nish soldiers, political leaders, and directors and officers of corporations
engaged in pillaging, but the corporations, as entities themselves, have es-
caped liability for their crimes.
The pillaging of natural resources will not stop until corporations
face accountability for the pillaging of natural resources. Doing this requires
the ICC to go after corporations for their direct, indirect, and silent complic-
ity in pillaging. The legal system to pursue these corporations already exists
under the ICC, but the international community must first amend the Rome
Statute's jurisdictional grant to cover corporations as well as "natural
persons."
164 See generally Elkins, supra note 161, at 73 (discussing in further detail the difference
between identification and imputation).
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